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We are going to have some strange experiences adjusting things before we are through with this aftermath of war.

The falsity of much that has been deemed essential must be demonstrated. Expediency must give way to duty; profit must become secondary to principle; selfishness must yield to altruism.

There can be no cure for the ills, contradictions, and the unrest of the world until faith in righteousness and the rule of universal justice are restored and made supreme in the life of men and of nations.

No man can live unto himself alone. No nation can live unto itself alone. Not in theory, but in absolute practice, mutuality is the world's single solvent, the one ideal that can produce lasting peace.

In America we think that our peculiar fortune in war has produced peculiar results, but a glance at the pages of history assures us otherwise.

War has always produced strangely similar results. It has always developed the profiteer beside the patriot; greed and dishonesty beside gallantry and devotion. The present atmosphere throughout the entire world is a dangerous one to idealism.

That condition is especially true here in—

"America, half-brother of the world,
With something good and bad of every land."

But the essential difficulties of our condition only make its possible glories greater.

We have lost, alas, the moral value of the tremendous sentimentalism with which we flung ourselves into the world conflict. It was the chance for the development of a stupendous force that might have led and saved the world.

It has gone down into the midst of the slimy tides of personal selfishness and grasping greed.

There remains a great object-lesson in the work of the American Red Cross, which was the heart of a nation mobilized for service. The record of what it did is written in syllables of gratitude and affection that the world will never tire of repeating. The story of its achievement is an epic whose splendor can never be sung, and that not because the Red Cross was anything new or unique or wonderful.

The Red Cross was merely the symbol of sacrifice—sacrifice that is the price of victory—victory that is the ideal that will make peace—the real, the lasting victory of a nation that learns that true greatness lies not in rich abundance nor in pampered selfishness, but in the service that loves itself last; that lives for all mankind.

It is a dream, you say. I fear I must grant you that; but remember that it is the dreamer that has always led the world.

Even in the sordid chapters of world history that lie behind us men have followed the signs upon the skies and not the foot-prints upon the sands.

For such a time; for such a crisis; for such a possibility—

"God give us men. The time demands
Strong minds, great hearts, true faith, and willing hands;
Men whom the lust of office does not kill;
Men whom the spoils of office cannot buy;

Men who possess opinions and a will;
Men who have honor; men who will not lie;
Men who can stand before a demagogue
And dam his treacherous flatteries without winking;
Tall men, sun-crowned, who live above the fog
In public duty and in private thinking."

A constructive foreign policy will fail that is not based in service; that does not know the throbbing soul of brotherhood.

But, knowing these, our weak endeavor attains a matchless power, for it lays our aspiration at the feet of Him who came—

"Not to be ministered unto, but to minister";

who gave His life for the world.

THE UNPOPULAR AMERICAN

By H. W. DUNNING

Of American Graves Registration Service, Paris

IT EASILY is understood how those who stay at home make the mistake of thinking of Americans as being at the height of popularity and glory abroad. Why not? Having won a long and bloody struggle for the Allies and dictated a victorious peace, we are preparing to put the world on its feet again with our money, food, and moral support. Europe, Asia, and Africa are our debtors.

And that fact, coupled with the attitude of the average American who visits Europe, and Europe's misconception of the average American, is the reason why, as individuals and as a nation, we are unpopular. Naturally, the trend of political events, to some extent, affects this international opinion of us; but the main factors are as already set forth. These observations are made after having visited practically every section of Europe with a view to determining the cause for the unpopular American.

Put a thermometer to gauge popularity in the mouth of each member of Europe's family of nations and notice their temperature.

As is to be expected, we are most popular among the small, new nations of central and southeastern Europe and western Asia—Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Czecho-Slovakia, Jugo-Slavia, the independent Arabic tribes of Mesopotamia and Yemen, Palestine, and Armenia. Four things are directly responsible for this: First, America's successful participation in the war and our stand at the peace table for the rights of small nations; second, the magnificent relief-work undertaken by the American Red Cross and Hoover Food Administration in the desolate provinces of these nations; third, the physical assistance rendered by individual Americans and American legions before and after the signing of the armistice with Germany; fourth, sales made and credits extended to these new nations.

As always has been the case, governments of newly created republics are more nearly in harmony with or more representative of the masses than is usually true of older, more established nations, where the rut of politics has been cut deeply. At first glance, this might

seem to have little bearing on the question of our popularity; but give it a second thought and you will see that it is merely a matter of being popular with the people, because they *are* the government, and they realize that in aiding the government we are aiding the individual.

In these small nations we are popular, not because we are their creditors, but despite this fact. Perhaps, as nations, they are too young and nationalization is too new for them to feel the weight of debt.

Gauging the new nations' approval of us at 100, how do the old-timers rate us?

Probably the next highest are little Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, and our late half-hearted enemy, Austro-Hungary, now Austria and Hungary. But now our successful participation in the war is crowded into the background, as of secondary importance, to make way for those Good Samaritan twins, the Red Cross and the Food Administration.

The Red Cross especially has been active in the Balkans, and the regard and admiration that it has gained for us is cited by the fact that, no matter how turbulent certain districts are politically, the American and his property are religiously respected. Nor will the three small nations soon forget our part in clearing their domains of occupation. In the case of Serbia, our credits and sales of supplies has been welcomed.

Austria and Hungary appreciate our relief aid, particularly that of the Food Administration, to such an extent that both Vienna and Budapest now have Americans administering their local food supplies in behalf of the national governments. The people of these two nations bear us no especial ill-will over late hostilities, but rather look on us as delivering them from a bad fix, into which they had fallen through their friendship with Germany. Of course, this will not hold true in all localities, for there are many Germans in the two nations; but the majority of Hungarians and Austrians, both upper and lower classes, are looking to the future and inviting the attention of American industry and capital.

Let us rate this group's esteem of us at 90.

Following the last-mentioned nations comes a group that is composed principally of neutrals during late hostilities—Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, and Portugal. They have no real cause for disliking us, while at the same time there is no especial reason why they should like us. The question, therefore, becomes one of personal approval of individuals; and, while the press of these countries take occasional pokes at our political leaders, our policies, and our customs, on the whole our popularity wave breaks on friendly shores. We are not loved, yet neither are we hated.

Let us rate ourselves 80.

We now come to a group of nations whose attitude is hard to explain and correspondingly hard to understand. This group is composed of Bulgaria, Roumania, Turkey, Greece, and Russia.

Bulgaria, as a people and as a government, is probably the most openly hostile member of the group, if not of Europe's family. The reason for this is that both the controlling power and the masses of Bulgaria are greedy for conquest and war spoils; and, being pri-

marily warriors, their defeat in the late struggle meant more to them than it would have to a less military race; also, being more primeval, they show it.

Roumania presents a curious contrast. The government, while outwardly very friendly, is in reality almost hostile to the American; the people, though reserved, are sincere in their respect and admiration. The reason is apparent, when it is explained that the militaristic party in power is eager for conquest and annexation, while the people desire peace so strongly that they almost lean toward the Bolshevik theory. It may be remarked, in this connection, that several times sales of war material and supplies made to Roumania by the A. E. F. have been held back from delivery in order to enforce certain military restrictions, and even after delivery considerable friction always occurs over settlements. Red Cross relief-work has done much to win the hearts of the people.

Turkey wants the United States to act as her guardian, but the unsophisticated American should not accept this as a sign that we are overwhelmingly popular at Constantinople. To the Harbord Military Commission and to those of us who have visited Turkey is given the ability to understand. Political Turkey figures that if Uncle Sam takes the mandate, it will mean an inflow of American capital and a chance for those in power to reap the benefits. In other words, it is a case of loving our money, not us. The people of Turkey are passive, even as are the Bulgars.

Our position in Greece resembles the way we are regarded by Roumania, with the exception that the people of Greece are more nearly in accord with the desires of the ruling clique—that is, for a greater Greece—the territorial Greece of old. And when America steps in against aggregation, we tread on some one's toes. Naturally, we are not going to be so awfully popular with the owner.

Russia presents a curious situation. To those of the masses not bitten with the Bolshevik bug, the American represents the ideal and is accorded the highest respect; but woe to the American who falls into the hands of the radicals. His life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness is doomed to be very short. Reading this, you might conclude that Lenin, Trotzky, and the other leaders of Bolshevikism are opposed to us; but there you would be mistaken, for I have it on good authority, from those who have talked with these men, that they are strongly pro-American.

So much for our "temperature 70" friendly enemies.

Having thus disposed of most of the smaller nations of Europe, we have left Belgium, England, France, Italy, and Germany—the nations where the extremes should be reached, but are not.

Here will be some surprises.

Belgium, no doubt, has been pictured by many as being so thoroughly enamoured of the United States that only our laws keep her out of the union. This belief should be revised. The people of Belgium, as a majority, deep down in their hearts, have little real adoration or sincere admiration for the Americans. They appreciate our aid as a financial asset and are willing to thank us for our military efforts, but we must face the fact that our true friend in this country is the royalist group, with democratic King Albert at its head.

It was King Albert and his little army of faithfuls who said, "They shall not pass without a fight," and when President Wilson visited Belgium, it was this little army, a minority of the population, who acclaimed him. The best rating we can give Belgium is 80—along with the neutrals.

England, on the other hand—ponderous, stolid old England, with whom we are always bickering and grumbling—has a better opinion of us. She even admits that if England had not won the war, America probably would have. Even yet she thinks us a little queer and inclined to brag, and nothing less than a trip to the States could convince her that we, as a nation, have entirely shed the clothes of the barbarian. To England we are as one of the family strayed from the fold and slightly changed by association with people beneath our social position. She rates us a good 90, and if Australia, Canada, and Africa were included, it would go a good 95.

The people of France, outside of Paris, are probably the most sincere admirers we have in Europe, but the minute one steps inside the exterior boulevards, things change. For this reason we had best consider France as France and Paris.

France is our sincere admirer, because we have reached nearer to the heart of France, have given more and asked less, and been less of a burden than is true in Paris. At Bordeaux we built docks, dredged rivers, and made friends with the town. Brest was given miles and miles of telephone and telegraph lines and an idea of American energy. Northern France became the ward of the Red Cross, various associations, and individual Americans.

Paris saw us only as wealthy creditors, riding in fine limousines, requisitioning dozens of needed hotels and office buildings and sending the cost of living sky-high by the payment of exorbitant prices and tips for anything that took our fancy. We came to Paris thirty thousand strong and settled on the city like a swarm of locusts—eating, drinking, and making merry. They wanted to treat us with polite friendliness, and we, in our American superiority, not understanding them, answered in rough banter. Now, the Frenchman has a keen sense of humor, but it is not of the same type as the American's, and he does not understand our joshing. When we tell him a good joke he laughs, but when we playfully remark that a single Yankee child can whip ten Frogs, his dignity is hurt, and, although he might not say so, he is resentful.

Political France is just a little peeved with Wilson, and provoked that we did not give our A. E. F. property as another partial payment on our debt to Lafayette. They do not seem to consider that \$300,000,000 sale as an accommodation.

And the American girl, when she comes to Paris, will find herself unpopular, because some priggish American welfare supervisor, during the high tide of the Y. M. C. A., K. of C., and Jewish Welfare Board occupancy of Paris, conceived the idea and passed the ruling that at dances and receptions given by these organizations no French girls would be allowed.

Considering France and Paris as one again, the thermometer reads about 85—between England and Belgium.

Next for our late ally and now near enemy, Italy.

Italy has been bitten by the same bug that nipped Greece, the bite of said bug causing dreams of rejuvenation. Italy is dreaming, scheming, and working for the old Roman Empire brought down to date. When Italy thought that we would sanction this ambition, Americans were very popular in the peninsula, as witness President Wilson's visit to that country; but when our representatives at the peace conference refused to approve the granting of certain territories to Italy, our popularity dropped several degrees. They even took to renaming newly christened streets and giving our soldiers stationed in Italy the cold shoulder. It was necessary to evacuate our troops and prohibit leaves into that country in the interest of good diplomacy. This dislike was, and to some extent still is, participated in by both government and people. However, Italy is temperamental and will soon forget and forgive, so that out of kindness of heart we will be lenient and read the thermometer at 70—just below Belgium.

We have left now only Germany—the country in which most of us don't care about being popular, but are.

An American in Germany cannot escape popularity. He has it thrust upon him. And the amusing part of it is that theirs is sincere, as far as German sincerity goes. The people in the provinces of Germany have always leaned toward us, even during hostilities; and, now that it is over, the military caste and Berlin are rather glad to admit, without animosity, that it was America who did it and not the rest of the Allies.

Of course, I know that there were so-called demonstrations against Americans in Berlin; but, being there at the time and acquainted with the situation, I can state that they were not real "hate" demonstrations, but just staged mob scenes, to affect decisions at Versailles.

The truth of the matter is, we rate higher in Germany than we do right at the present time in Italy; in fact, along with our late ally, Belgium, and the neutrals.

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GERMANY

By HANS WEHBERG

A Translation

IN A PETITION of July 15, 1919, the German League for a League of Nations has submitted to the Department of Arts, Sciences, and Public Instruction plans for the promotion of the instruction in international law in the universities, in order to open a way for the scientific introduction into the questions of international law and the League of Nations. But the understanding for these far-reaching problems ought to permeate the whole German people. Therefore this work ought not to be restricted to the reform in the instruction of the university students. It is necessary to start in the secondary schools and the colleges to arouse the proper spirit for the new problems of our time and to point out that a new era has begun for the mutual understanding and the political intercourse of nations.